militarized action-in which third parties engage; (2) to expand our conception of what constitutes a third party by including coalitions of states, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in our data; and (3) to enlarge the temporal framework of current investigations on third parties by including interventions occurring before and after an MID. The methods we followed in the process of consulting sources, gathering information, and compiling the data closely resemble the methods Bremer had perfected in the MIDs project. The philosophy behind the project reflects his ideas about the role that third parties play in the processes of conflict expansion and conflict resolution.
This paper begins with a description of the genesis of our project and the methods followed in our efforts to collect a richer record on third-party partisan interventions in militarized interstate disputes. It proceeds with a preliminary analysis of some general patterns and trends emerging from the newly collected data. We place particular emphasis on the identity of third parties, the frequency of their intervention, and the "techniques" they use. Finally, we loosely replicate Yamamoto and Bremer's (1980) study on major power interventions in conflict, showing that their finding concerning the role of major power status on the likelihood of intervention in an ongoing conflict is supported, and actually strengthened, by using the new data.
Collecting New Data on Third Parties: Rationale and Investigative Framework
The idea of collecting data about third parties' nonneutral partisan interventions in disputes stems from an earlier effort to gather information about third parties' neutral interventions. Dixon (1993 Dixon ( , 1994 Dixon ( , 1996 , Raymond (1994) , and other scholars had emphasized the role that neutral mediators play in preserving peace between states and in managing conflicts when hostilities do arise. They also raised concerns about the inadequacy of existing data on mediation, and the initial focus of our project was to address their concerns by exploring further third parties' techniques for peaceful conflict management. While the interest in mediation and neutral intervention was never abandoned, in part upon Bremer's suggestion, the study soon evolved to include information about instances of third parties' partisan interventions. Since a record of states' participation in militarized disputes already exists, 3 the question emerges of why we felt it necessary to compile a new dataset of third parties' participation in MIDs. The answer to this question has several parts.
First, in the process of gathering data on states' mediatory efforts, we encountered strong evidence that, in their effort to manage ongoing conflicts, third parties do not intervene in MIDs only neutrally. Rather, sometimes they choose to side with one of the disputants. Third parties may not show a manifest preference for either side in a conflict, yet they may come to see that the most cost-effective or expedient way to bring a conflict to termination is to favor one side over the other. In some instances, this may be done to redress battlefield imbalances and bring about a "hurting stalemate" that may force the combatants to the negotiating table. Other conflicts, instead, may not be reasonably resolved with a negotiated settlement and may only end with a decisive victory by one side. In addition, several studies have identified the factors that may affect a third party's decision to lean toward one side in a dispute rather than the other (see, for, instance, Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita, 1979; Kim, 1991; Werner & Lemke, 1997) . Thus, our efforts to provide a full picture of third parties' techniques for conflict management would have been incomplete had we not introduced partisan interventions in the project.
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R. Corbetta and W. J. Dixon The second portion of the answer is that we found considerable evidence that states are not alone in intervening in a partisan fashion to manage a conflict. IGOs and, occasionally, NGOs do get involved in ongoing militarized disputes by actively taking sides with one of the disputants. Although their degree of involvement rarely matches that of third-party states, their intervention may have an impact on the combatants' perceptions of the strategic environment and on the menus of options available to them. In addition, such interventions may influence the behavior of other third parties, including states. Because of the many ways in which nonstate actors contribute to the evolution of conflict, we felt it necessary to incorporate nonstate actors into the project about third parties' interventions.
Third, we soon encountered evidence that third parties do not just intervene militarily in ongoing MIDs. Rather, they employ a variety of techniques in taking sides with disputants. Such techniques may range from simply diplomatic expressions of opposition or support to the actual militarized level as recorded by the MIDs project. We know that states starting a dispute often take a variety of steps of progressive intensity before resorting to military force. Similarly, third-party states may resort to a variety of conflict-management techniques of a nonmilitary nature before resorting to militarized action. Scholars of conflict have recognized that nonmilitary interventions may alter the course and outcome of an ongoing conflict (see, for instance, Bueno de Mesquita, 1981; Holsti, 1983 ). Yet, there is no record of such interventions. As studies about third parties' neutral interventions have shown (Raymond, 1994; Dixon, 1993 Dixon, , 1994 Dixon, , 1996 , outcomes generally attributed to traditional conflict variables such as power relations between states or issues of contention may actually depend on the undetected-because nonmilitary-participation by third parties.
Fourth, it also became evident that in many instances the decision by third states to join an ongoing conflict militarily did not occur instantaneously. Many studies of joining behavior have modeled interventions in ongoing conflicts as a sudden transition from noninvolvement to full participation. However, the historical record reveals that a series of steps of increasing intensity precede in many cases the third party's decision to commit fully to a conflict. Steps of increasing intensity often lead to militarized participation. Military historians have long recognized the idea that conflict initiation involves steps of increasing intensity, ranging from nonmilitary action toward the use of full-scale military force (see, for instance, Dupuy & Dupuy, 1993 , 1035 . Vasquez (1993 Vasquez ( , 2000 Vasquez ( , 2004 also documents and provides evidence that states go through several steps, each involving increasing hostility, before actually resorting to full-scale violence and then to war. It is not necessary for states to go through each of these steps on their path to war. Some steps can be skipped, and war may still occur. Similarly, it is not necessary for states that have taken some of these steps to go all the way to war. Yet, Vasquez (2000) makes it clear that taking each of these sequential steps raises the likelihood of war. In addition, deescalation of tension becomes more difficult for each step states choose to take on the escalation ladder. A process similar to the "steps of war" may also regulate the dynamic by which third parties become military participants in a dispute. 4 Our observations that the decision to join ongoing conflicts extends beyond militarized actions-and that the decision to join often takes shape gradually-raised theoretical and methodological concerns. If those observations are correct, current research on joining behavior has very likely been based on a limited set of cases: those cases in which third parties walked through all of the "steps to joining," selecting themselves into the sample of military interventions. Instances in which third parties "tested the waters" and then chose not to enter a conflict are excluded from most of the existing conflict datasets. Despite the aforementioned theories claiming that nonviolent forms of intervention may alter the evolution and outcome of conflicts, most existing studies on third-party interventions treat such occurrences as nonevents. Working with only a small subset of the population of third parties' interventions in disputes has a variety of severe implications. It can lead researchers to misrepresent the tendency of third parties to balance or bandwagon. It can lead to incomplete evaluations of the likelihood that states will respect their preconflict commitments. It can lead to both an underestimation of states' propensity to become involved in MIDs and to an overestimation of the propensity to intervene militarily. It can lead to a biased assessment of the effect of some of the covariates scholars usually find to be associated with joining behavior. It can lead scholars to incorrectly model the impact that expectations about third parties' behavior have on the calculations of the initiators of a conflict. Finally, it can lead to unsound conclusions about the complex dynamics of conflict expansion in space and time and about the factors affecting the duration of conflict participation.
5 Thus, developing a richer and broader record of third-party intervention in conflicts has implications for a vast number of theoretical frameworks and empirical puzzles that have dominated the study of conflict in recent times, from realism to the opportunity and willingness approach, from studies of alliance reliability to issues of foreign policy substitutability.
While reasons for building a new record of third-party intervention abound, the problems associated with the pursuit of that objective can be daunting. Given the complexity and magnitude of the task involved in identifying and categorizing multiple, often repeated interventions in MIDs by many third parties of different kinds, the greatest challenge was to develop a working framework that would allow us to proceed systematically in the collection process. Two crucial choices were made. First, our initial effort was focused on the interventions as our unit of observation, rather than on the joiners. Second, for a variety of reasons, both practical and theoretical, we chose to pursue a dyadic approach in the investigation process. We identified 357 dyads that experienced at least one militarized dispute (as originators) after 1945. We ranked dyads based on the number of militarized disputes they experienced since the end of World War II. The list is topped by the United States-Russia (Soviet Union) dyad with 54 militarized disputes. Dyads experiencing only one militarized dispute clustered at the end of the list. We excluded from the data collection process dyads experiencing only a day-long dispute.
6 These procedural choices left us with 314 post-WWII dyads to investigate.
The second challenge was to identify the range of nonneutral, partisan actions that third parties may take in MIDs and ascertain that such categories were exhaustive and mutually exclusive. Through the preliminary analysis of a handful of MID dyads in a pilot study (Dixon, 1998) , categories of partisan interventions were identified and are shown in Table 1 . To some extent, the possible third-party actions we identified reflect classification schemes used to catalogue state actions that have been developed in a variety of event data projects, such COPDAB (Azar, 1980) , WEIS (see Vincent, 1983; Goldstein, 1992) , KEDS (Gerner et al., 1994) , and, more recently, IDEA (King & Lowe, 2003) . Partisan interventions range from simple verbal expressions of support to militarized actions, as identified by the MIDs project. Verbal expressions of opposition or support must be uttered by an official representative of a government or organization on behalf of the entire government or organization in order to be classified as interventions.
7 Existing collections of event data such as WEIS and IDEA assume that verbal expressions of opposition against or support for another state rank lower on their interstate conflict-cooperation scale (Goldstein, 1992) . We followed the same approach and assumed that verbal expressions reflect a lower level of commitment or willingness on the part of a third party than more costly forms of interventions, such as economic and military actions. The assumption was also based on the observation that it is easier for governments or organizations to reverse a position taken in a simple verbal statement than to back out of agreements or promises involving economic or military assistance or punishment.
Thus, the second and third categories of third-party partisan interventions group economic and military interventions. In both cases, we began with verbal statements involving promises or threats of military or economic action. Thus, we included official promises of economic support and official threats of military sanctions. We also chose to include offers of military assistance and actual military assistance to one party to a dispute when the information was available. When we reach the level of threats to use force in support of one party to a dispute, the dataset begins to overlap with MID data. We deemed that this overlap could be useful to reconstruct the chain of actions of increasing intensity that lead to the militarization of a partisan intervention whenever such escalation occurs.
Having identified a universe of cases for the investigation and a unit of analysis, the process of data collection began with the construction of narratives for each individual dyad from 1946 to 2001. Each narrative described the events leading to one or more militarized disputes within a dyad and contained information about potential and actual interventions by third parties. The information contained in each narrative was derived from a standard set of primary and secondary sources. Newspapers-in particular The New York Times and The Times of London-and chronologies, such as Facts on File and Keesing's Record of Contemporary Events provided the backbone for each narrative. The description of events was enriched by pre-existing compilations of interstate conflicts and crisis, such as Weisburd (1997) and Bercovitch and Jackson (1997) , historical almanacs, and, where available, regional sources.
Several graduate students were responsible for collecting the event information and compiling the narratives. They were asked to follow a standard operating procedure both in the investigation of the facts and in the composition of the narratives. Senior researchers checked the reliability and consistency across narratives produced by different investigators at different stages in the process. Both senior researchers and graduate students coded the narratives for each post-WWII dyad with the aid of standard code-sheets. 8 In addition to identifying the identity of the disputants, the intervening third party, and the intervention technique, the coding sheets required coders to record the beginning and end date for each intervention, whether the third party resorted to more than one technique, how many personnel were involved in the intervention, and the number of casualties.
One of the biggest challenges was to "unitize" third party interventions, especially because it is easier to observe the beginning of third-party actions than their end. Because the intervention was our unit of analysis, it was decided that the beginning and ending date for verbal intervention should be the date on which a third party makes an appeal, threat, offer, etc. Because nonverbal interventions last longer than verbal ones and because it is often difficult to detect their termination, it was decided that their ending date should be the same as the dispute's ending date when we could not identify a more precise date from the sources. For those interventions occurring before or after a dispute, we preferred to leave ending dates as missing if we could not identify a precise termination.
We also encountered instances of multiple interventions by the same third party in a dispute and instances in which a third party employs multiple intervention techniques. Again, we coded repeated interventions by the same third party as separate interventions. When a third party intervened with multiple techniques at the same time, we coded as "primary" intervention technique the action reported by most sources. When multiple sources were not available, we coded as primary technique the intervention technique most strongly emphasized in the record according to the coder's judgment. On 139 occasions (7.69 percent of the total interventions), third parties used two intervention techniques. In 27 cases (1.55 percent of the total), a third party employed three intervention techniques simultaneously. We found no evidence of third parties using more than three intervention techniques at the same time. Most instances of multiple intervention techniques are combinations of multiple verbal appeals or threats (for instance, a simultaneous appeal for a cease-fire and troop withdrawal to one party in a dispute) or the employment of multiple forms of military force (for instance, the simultaneous use of ground troops and air force).
9 Where multiple 46 R. Corbetta and W. J. Dixon intervention techniques were employed, the ending date of the intervention was the ending date of the "primary" technique.
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To guarantee consistency in the events being coded, several intercoder reliability checks were conducted. At the end of the research process, of the 314 post-WWII dyads experiencing at least one dispute longer than one day, 176 witnessed third-party interventions of some sort. The total number of interventions catalogued in the dataset is 1809. This is quite a larger number of interventions than the 355 post-WWII militarized interventions contained in version 3.0 of the MID dataset. There is a mean of 10.28 interventions per dyad, if only the dyads experiencing interventions are taken into account. The mean is 5.76 per dyad if all post-WWII dyads experiencing at least one dispute longer than one day are included.
During the process of compilation of the dyads' narratives, it soon became evident that third parties do not just intervene in the course of a militarized dispute. A cursory overview of the first narratives compiled suggested that, unless a MID starts suddenly and unexpectedly without a preceding crisis, third parties are likely to intervene before and/or after the militarization of a dispute. Although it is important to keep in mind that we only looked at dyads experiencing at least one militarized dispute, it is plausible that nonneutral intervention in a crisis preceding a MID can have an effect on the likelihood that the crisis will become a militarized incident. Intervention in the phases following the termination of a MID may have an impact on the recurrence of MIDs within the same dyad of originators. We deemed the collection of data about potential interventions surrounding the actual start and end of a militarized dispute to be of theoretical relevance. We established the procedure of researching events occurring two weeks before and after a dispute. That two-week window could expand if we encountered evidence of a brewing crisis or of extended dispute deescalation. Following Dixon (1998), we maintained a distinction between interventions that are "precipitated" by a specific MID-those interventions occurring between the start and end date of a dispute-and interventions surrounding a MID. Overall, 340 third-party interventions (19.03 percent of the total) occurred before or after a militarized dispute. The remaining interventions were, instead, precipitated by an ongoing dispute. The following section describes some of the information extracted from the preliminary analysis of 1809 instances of third-party interventions for the 1946-2001 period.
Descriptive Analysis of the Data and Some Preliminary Findings
It is a good but often forgotten practice for all researchers to get to know the structure of their own data before diving into testing hypotheses through ultrasophisticated econometric models. Descriptive analysis of the available data can provide substantive information about real-life political phenomena; it may suggest new hypotheses to explore; it may prevent one from investigating hypotheses or adopting models that make little sense in light of the data available and the processes that generate them. One of the first things to askespecially with international relations data-is how one's data are distributed over time. Figure 1 shows the number of interventions per year since the end of WWII. The year with the most interventions (117) is 1968, immediately followed by 1970 with 96 interventions. The Vietnam War was indeed a catalyst for third-party interventions, arguably because of both its duration and the nature of the actors and political interests involved in the conflict. Figure 1 also reveals peaks in the number of third-party interventions in connection to 10 A future goal of this project is to produce an additional version of the data centering on thirdparty states as the unit of analysis. The objectives are: (1) to disaggregate interventions in which secondary and tertiary intervention techniques were employed into individual interventions; and (2) to disaggregate interventions by coalitions and IGOs into individual interventions for the participating states. major conflicts. There were 77 interventions in 1951, at the apex of the Korean War. There were 68 and 81 interventions during 1983 and 1986, respectively. Many interventions in 1983 were associated with the U.S. invasion of Grenada and Soviet action in Afghanistan. United States action against Libya in 1986 also drew a lot of opposition from the international community. The large number of interventions in 1992 is due to the skirmishes between the United States, Britain, and Iraq following the end of the first Gulf War, to the numerous conflicts that followed the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and to the Bosnian crisis.
The data shown in Figure 1 include both precipitated interventions (i.e., those that occurred within the temporal boundaries of a militarized dispute) and nonprecipitated interventions (i.e., interventions occurring before or after the official beginning and end of a disputes). Analysis not shown here indicates that there is not a remarkable relationship pattern between the number of MID-precipitated interventions and the total number of interventions in a given year. That is, the frequency of nonprecipitated interventions is not simply a reflection of the total number of interventions. Similarly, there is no indication that the number of interventions in any year and over time is simply a function of the number of militarized disputes in that year. The relationship between MID occurrences per year and the number of third-party interventions is actually negative. Figure 2 compares the frequency of militarized disputes per year and the frequency of third-party interventions per year after WWII. A visual inspection of the graph seems to confirm the results of correlation analysis. No consistent pattern of covariation between MID occurrences and third states' interventions seems to emerge. This also indirectly suggests the hypothesis that it is not the number of militarized disputes occurring in a given year that determines the number of third-party interventions. Rather, the specific traits of certain disputes and the characteristics of the actors involved seem to be more likely to draw third-party interventions. Hypotheses about those states' and disputes' characteristics that may precipitate militarized interventions have been raised in works by Kaw (1990) , Kim (1991) , Smith (1996) , Werner and Lemke (1997) , and Yamamoto and Bremer (1980) . Some preliminary analysis on this issue with the present data (not shown here) suggests that differences exist between those disputes and state traits that elicit militarized interventions and those dispute and state traits that promote nonmilitary interventions.
Since not all interventions in the data are military in character, it is important to explore the relative frequency of intervention over time by intervention technique. Of the 1809 interventions, 1283, or 70.92 percent of the total, are diplomatic. Another 413 interventions (22.83 percent) are military. Only 113 interventions (6.25 percent) are economic in character. Thus, third parties seem to prefer either diplomatic or military interventions to economic ones. While this phenomenon awaits a systematic explanation, it is plausible that diplomatic and military interventions are more frequent simply because states, who constitute the majority of interveners, prefer such techniques. Economic aid and, especially, economic sanctions can be more effective if implemented collectively-often in the context of international organizations. Economic interventions can be rather expensive forms of interventions that may have a long-term impact, while states look for forms of intervention with immediate impact that do not require coordination among a large number of actors. Most important, these figures reinforce the idea that military interventions constitute only a relatively small share of joining activities occurring during or around militarized disputes. In addition to the use, display, or threat to use force, third parties have at their disposal other techniques for influencing the outcomes of international conflicts. The military option is frequently employed, but its use is just not as frequent as one would conclude by looking at the existing conflict datasets. This seems to be consistent with the fact that the majority of militarized disputes recorded in the MID data sets remain bilateral. Figure 3 shows the frequency of diplomatic, economic, and military third-party interventions for the entire post-WWII period, regardless of whether the interventions occurred during a MID (those we labeled as "precipitated" interventions) or not. Visual inspection of the graph suggests that there is no consistent pattern of covariation between different types of third-party interventions. The frequencies of diplomatic, military, and, to a lesser extent, economic interventions mirror each other until the mid-1960s. Arguably because of the Vietnam War, we see a sharp divergence in the frequency of military and diplomatic interventions lasting for approximately a decade. The same pattern is observable during the 1980s. As noted previously, both time periods were marked by intense superpower activity. Dispute involvement by major powers is likely to draw the attention and participationboth in support of and against-of other states. These patterns seem to confirm the notion that conflicts involving major-power states are more likely to expand. The years with the highest number of military interventions are 1951 and 1992, with 28 and 25 militarized third-party involvements, respectively. Such a high number of military interventions are related to the Korean War and to post-Gulf War skirmishes between Iraq and the coalition forces.
Since most of the existing studies on joining behavior have focused on military interventions, it is worth asking whether there is any relationship between the frequency of military interventions and the frequency of third-party interventions overall. That is, is the frequency of military interventions relatively constant over time? Or does it fluctuate with other types of military interventions? It appears that the number of military interventions in a given year is not a function of the total number of third-party participations in that year (Pearson's r = .47). On the other hand, because the number of diplomatic interventions overall is such a great fraction of the total number of interventions, it is no surprise that strong correlation between the two exists (Pearson's r = .96). The number of economic interventions is a much smaller fraction of the total number of interventions. It peaks in 1951, due to the numerous sanctions against China for its intervention in the Korean War. But it remains steady over time, experiencing only minor oscillations in the late 1970s to early 1980s, due to the Iranian hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the U.S. invasion of Grenada, and in the mid 1990s, due to sanctions against Iraq and the former Yugoslav countries. It is worth noting that there is no discernible change in patterns of frequency in type of intervention over time if only precipitated interventions-those occurring within the temporal boundaries of a MID-are included in the analysis.
Who Intervenes?
After describing investigation criteria and general trends in the data, the question of who intervenes is arguably the most important one to be addressed. As mentioned above, we recorded data on different types of third parties: states, IGOs, NGOs, and coalitions of states. Although states form the bulk of third party interveners, it is possible for nonstate actors to affect the evolution and outcome of a dispute or rivalry by either managing or escalating the conflict. Table 2 shows the overall frequency of third-party interventions by type and intervention technique.
The table confirms that states are the actors who intervene the most in other states' disputes, regardless of the intervention technique employed. Participation by other actors is a less frequent event. IGOs and NGOs are, in fact, more likely to intervene in conflicts in a neutral, rather than partisan, form. The notable exception here is the IGOs' proclivity to resort to diplomatic means of partisan intervention. Although it is not shown here, evidence indicates that such interventions take the form of expression of opposition or appeal for cease-fire directed to only one side in a conflict. The coalition of states category is somewhat underrepresented due to the stricter coding rules employed. In order for a group of states to intervene as a coalition, there had to be evidence of coordinated multilateral action among third parties from the first day of the intervention. Lacking such evidence, we preferred to code uncoordinated collective interventions or situations in which a coalition against a disputant took shape over time as separate state interventions. Nonetheless, this strict definition manages to capture the most evident instances of multilateral coordinated action, such as the 1991 Gulf War. Again unsurprisingly, NGOs are less likely to intervene in It can be argued that the distinction between states, IGOs, and coalitions as interveners can be analytically important but often too vague. After all, IGOs rarely or never act without the consent of their member-states, and especially major powers. Similarly, it can be difficult to think of a coalition of states as a unitary actor operating independently of its constituent states. It is then important to point out that the present third-party intervention data contain information that allows researchers to disaggregate the actions by IGOs and coalitions into actions by individual states. When a group of states or an international organization carries out an intervention, the name and number of individual states taking part in the intervention are recorded when the information is available.
12 With regard to interventions by coalitions and economic and military interventions by IGOs, data on the individual participating states is available in most cases. The same information is less frequently available for diplomatic interventions by IGOs, which in many cases involve collective official statements and resolutions passed by a majority vote by the IGO collective bodies.
We have shown the distribution of interventions over time by type above. What is, then, the distribution of interventions by third party type over the 1946-2001 period? Figure 4 shows temporal fluctuations in the frequency of interventions by states, coalitions of states, and IGOs. NGO interventions have not been included due to their small number. Clearly, the pattern observed is not dissimilar to patterns displayed earlier. The number of interventions by states and IGOs seems to follow one another fairly closely until the mid-1960s, when the number of state interventions skyrockets. The frequencies of state and IGO interventions return to following one another again in the 1980s. However, what is more interesting to notice is the slow but steady increase in the number of IGO interventions over time. This growth is detectable especially after 1980 and peaks in the early 1990s, when IGO interventions were even more numerous than state interventions. The data provide support to well-known accounts concerning the evolution, successes, and failures of IGO conflict-management attempts after WWII (see, for instance, Mingst & Karns, 1999) .
Because the vast majority of third-party participants are individual states, the following section focuses on patterns of state intervention in militarized disputes. Particular attention is given to the question of which states and what type of states actually get involved in ongoing MIDs.
Which States Intervene?
Given that the vast majority of interventions in ongoing disputes are carried out by states, it is important to ask, which states tend to intervene more than others? What are those state-level traits that make some countries more prone to joining in a conflict than others? 11 The low number of IGO and NGO interventions in the dataset may be surprising. The low number is explained by the fact that our list of IGOs and NGOs was based on lists of such organizations derived from the Union of International Agencies (UIA). Rebel groups, terrorist organizations, and other nonstate actors, as reported by Lemke (2003) , may wield considerable resources and act in state-like fashion as third parties in conflicts. Yet, because of various resource constraints, we could not include those interventions in the present version of the data.
12 Discrepancies in the number of militarized interventions between the MID data and the present data are largely due to the fact that many state interventions that the MID data record as individual action qualify as collective interventions under our classification scheme. We are currently developing a version of the data in which collective interventions by coalitions and IGOs are disaggregated by participating state. Even a superficial overview of the data may provide preliminary answers to these questions and suggest more precise hypotheses to explore further. The permanent members of the Security Council also seem to hold a monopoly on the use of military force. The Security Council's permanent members also account for 66 percent of all state military interventions (226 out of 339). Great Britain, the least militarily active among the "Big Five," has almost twice as many military interventions as Egypt, the closest "runner-up." Beyond the five permanent members, we find-not unsurprisingly-regional great powers, close allies of the United States, and aspiring great powers. The most active joiners are Western states, but the Middle East is-again unsurprisingly-overrepresented. The African continent is underrepresented despite the large number of conflicts fought in the region after WWII.
With regard to individual third-party states, the table above suggests that approximately one-fourth of all post-WWII joining behavior is attributable to the United States, which registered 294 out 1264 total interventions. The gap between the U.S. level of foreign policy involvement and that of its competitors is striking. The United States has almost twice as many interventions as Russia/USSR, the second-most active intervener. The figures may provide supporting evidence to the argument that, beyond the idea of bipolarity, the Cold War international system was truly a hegemonic system. There also is remarkable disparity within the five great powers and other internationally active states in regard to the use of military intervention techniques. The United States has four times as many military interventions as Russia and France, the second-and third-most militarily active states. The United States has a disproportionate number of economic interventions compared to other countries-arguably a reflection of the disparity between American economic power and the economic power of other countries. Despite the availability of greater economic means, the United States has nevertheless preferred military techniques to other techniques. Forty-five percent of US joining actions are military. In comparison, only thirty-eight percent (approximately) of France's-the second-most active joiner-interventions are military.
The data provide a good portrait of the post-1945 international system. Frequency and intensity of joining behavior can be good indicators not just of major power status, but also of hegemonic status. Major power states intervene more often than other states in militarized disputes and are more likely to do so with military means. Figure 5 shows temporal patterns similar to those outlined earlier. Even for major-power states, the temporal patterns in the frequency of militarized and nonmilitarized (diplomatic and economic) interventions track each other over time closely, with the exception of the mid-1960s to mid-1970s period. However, the proportion of militarized to nonmilitarized interventions appears much higher in the early stages of the Cold War. There seems to be a slightly temporal trend of diminishing militarized interventions vis-à-vis nonmilitarized interventions that deserves further scrutiny in the future.
Moving beyond the descriptive statistics just presented, Table 4 evaluates the strength of the relationship between major-power status and the propensity to intervene militarily, showing that the association is strongly (statistically) significant. The association is also strong between major-power status and diplomatic intervention, but weaker with regard to major-power status and the tendency to intervene with economic means. The inclusion of data concerning forms of intervention other than military ones does not alter the relationship between major-power status and joining behavior. Rather, the data bring to the light more strongly those behavioral differences between great powers and "ordinary states" that are frequently highlighted in the conflict literature.
Major-Power States and Interventions in Disputes
Descriptive and univariate analysis of the data provide sufficiently strong evidence that, with regard to joining ongoing disputes, major-power states behave quite differently from other states. And it was indeed the behavior of the great powers that was of special interest to Stuart Bremer. In his aforementioned "Wider Wars and Restless Nights" piece with Yamamoto, Bremer explored a set of hypotheses concerning the tendency of major states to become involved in ongoing wars. By definition, major-power states differ from minor powers not only with regard to material capabilities, but also with regard to the range of their foreign policy interests and their degree of activity on the international arena (Singer & Small, 1972) . Because of this, Yamamoto and Bremer (1980) indirectly argued, major power states are more likely to (1) become involved in ongoing wars and (2) to drag one another into wars, generating a spiraling dynamic of conflict enlargement.
At a time when multistage selection models and strategic interaction models were yet to be "discovered" and could not easily be implemented with commercial software, Yamamoto and Bremer (1980) tested their hypotheses with a series of probabilistic models, which they labeled "independent choice," "one-way conditional choice," and "two-way conditional choice." The independent choice model assumes that each major-power state joins a war without considering the actions of other major-power states, and therefore the probability of joining remains constant for each major power. The one-way and two-way conditional choice models, instead, test the hypotheses that major-power states base their decision to enter an ongoing conflict on the actions of other major powers. More specifically, Chi-square = 17.4078; Pr = 0.0000. war entry by a major power increases the probability that other major powers will join.
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They found that the two conditional choice models perform better than the independent choice model, and that successive major-power interventions increase the probability of future major-power interventions. Without necessarily replicating Yamamoto and Bremer's (1980) probability models, we have used the data presented in the preceding sections to test the hypotheses they developed and to investigate whether their findings hold if we extend the analysis to interventions in militarized disputes and to all forms of intervention, military and nonmilitary. We did this through a series of logistic regression models. The first set of models is similar to Yamamoto and Bremer's (1980) independent choice model in that it simply predicts whether majorpower status affects the probability that a state will join a dispute. The second set of models, instead, is similar to Yamamoto and Bremer's (1980) conditional choice models because it predicts whether the number of major-power states that have joined a dispute at time t affects the probability that another major-power state will join at time t + 1.
We operationalized our dependent variable as a dummy variable coded 1 if a majorpower state joins an ongoing dispute, and 0 if it does not. We tested whether major-power status and previous number of major-power joiners affect the overall likelihood that a third party will join, the likelihood that it will join militarily, and the likelihood that it will join nonmilitarily, i.e., adopting a diplomatic or economic technique. Since the dataset includes only instances of intervention, we merged our data with a dispute-dyad year dataset created with version 3.0 of the EUGene software (Bennett & Stam, 2000) . We matched all post-1945 dyads of MIDs originators with all potential joiners for a given dyad-dispute year.
14 For the second set of models, we used only the potential major-power joiners. Finally, we excluded nonprecipitated interventions, i.e., interventions that occur either immediately before or immediately after a MID.
We included in the model a set of control variables found to be associated with the probability of intervention in the literature on joining behavior. We chose to control for material capabilities because their possession increases a state's opportunity to become involved in an ongoing conflict.
15 Material capabilities are measured with the well-known Correlates of War's CINC score. Because so many third-party interventions in MIDs are carried out by the United States and other Western democracies, we chose to control for the regime type of potential and actual joiners. We measured regime type with the Polity III democracy autocracy index. Because new evidence suggests that alliance pacts are actually quite reliable (Leeds, Long, & McLaughlin Mitchell, 2000) , we controlled for the presence of an alliance between third parties and either-but not both-disputants. We followed Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita (1979) in assuming that a third party will be indifferent between two dispute originators-and therefore not likely to intervene-if it has an alliance with both. A large number of studies have found contiguity to be strongly related to the expansion of conflict in space. We included contiguity in the model as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a third party is directly contiguous to or separated by less than 150 miles of water from either or both disputants, and 0 otherwise. Finally, because disputes that are more violent are likely to draw states' attention and to increase the likelihood of intervention in general and militarized intervention in particular, we controlled for the hostility level of the dispute. This set of control variables is by no means exhaustive. A much wider variety of factors have been found to affect the probability of third-party intervention in the literature. Yet, because their inclusion would move us away from the original focus of Yamamoto and Bremer's study, we chose to keep the model as simple as possible.
The results of the logistic regression analysis are presented in Tables 5 and 6 . In both sets of models, estimates are clustered on the individual dispute to take into account within-group dependence of observations. Robust standard errors are used. Yamamoto and Bremer (1980) had found weak support for their independent choice model. The models in Table 5 suggest that, when we expand our empirical domain to include different forms of third-party interventions in militarized disputes, major-power status has an independent significant effect on the probability of intervention. This effect persists after controlling for the variables usually associated with joining behavior and regardless of whether we look at the probability of military intervention or the probability of nonmilitary intervention. These results confirm the impression developed in previous sections that frequencies and modes of interventions in ongoing conflicts are largely shaped by the decision of major-power states. They also reinforce the argument that major-power status is not just an attribute based on capabilities. Rather, it is an attribute with several behavioral dimensions, and joining behavior is one such dimension. Table 6 presents results of logit regression on just the major-power states' decisions to intervene. It is similar to Yamamoto and Bremer's (1980) conditional choice models because each major power's choice at time t+1 depends on the number of major-power states that have previously joined the dispute. The results indicate that Yamamoto and Bremer's (1980) conclusions about the propensity of dragging one another into conflicts holds true despite the changes we brought to the definition of conflict and to the meaning of intervention. Nonmilitary interventions by major-power states increase the likelihood of nonmilitary interventions by other major powers. Similarly, the likelihood of military interventions is affected by previous major powers' military interventions. The number of major powers in disputes affects the overall likelihood of further major power entry, regardless of type of intervention and control variables. With regard to the models' control variables, they all individually increase the likelihood of third-party intervention. As hypothesized in previous sections, being a democracy makes it more likely that a state will intervene in a dispute. Material capabilities, contiguity with the disputants, and the level of hostility within the dispute all significantly increase chances of third-party intervention, regardless of whether we consider militarized or nonmilitarized interventions. The only control variable that changes from one set of models to the next is the presence of alliances. Alliance with either dispute originators makes it more likely for a third party to join, but it does not affect the decision of major-power states. There are several reasons that may explain this change in results. First, major-power states have more alliance ties than minor powers and therefore are more likely to have alliances with both disputants-an occurrence that we coded as zero. Second, major-power states truly are concerned with each other's actions, and that concern is so great that it overrides promises and commitments previously made to other states. Finally, as indicated by Leeds, Long, and McLaughlin Mitchell (2000) , alliance commitments have too many degrees of complexity and specificity to be coded as a simple dichotomous variable.
Although rather simplistic and not completely faithful to their approach, this multivariate analysis goes one step beyond Yamamoto and Bremer's (1980) . It does not fully capture the intricacies of their probabilistic models, but it reflects the substance of their empirical puzzle and their theoretical approach. It reinforces Yamamoto and Bremer's (1980) intuition that joining behavior in conflict is a phenomenon largely dominated by major-power states and by their concerns with each other's actions. The use of a new dataset allows us to better describe the contours of the relationship between major-power status, major-power interaction, and intervention in conflict. It becomes possible to eliminate some of the restrictions that Yamamoto and Bremer (1980) imposed on their own findings and to conclude that major-power states tend to drag one another not just into wars but also into disputes. It is also possible to speculate that the widening of conflicts described by Yamamoto and Bremer (1980) begins before the militarization of interventions. The major powers' "fatal attraction" toward one another and toward violent conflict begins at the level of diplomatic and economic involvement in other states' disputes. 16 The present analysis does not explore the question of whether nonmilitary intervention increases the probability of successive militarized intervention. Yet, the use of our data places Yamamoto and Bremer's (1980) findings-and the results presented in the existing literature on joining behaviorin a different light by adding a new dimension to the dynamic of conflict evolution and escalation.
Conclusions
Potential and actual interventions by third parties in ongoing conflicts have enormous impact not only on the evolution and outcomes of such conflicts but also on the their initiation. States contemplating the decision to start a confrontation take into consideration possible third-party interventions (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981) and, after starting a conflict, behave in such as a way as to keep third parties out of the conflict (Werner, 2000) . Stuart Bremer was among the first to understand and explore the role of third parties, and in particular of majorpower states, in interstate conflicts. His interest in the issue of joining behavior extended to his analysis of dangerous dyads, as he pointed out that certain dyads are especially dangerous because they invite third-party interventions and contribute to the expansion of interstate conflict. At different stages in his career, Bremer encouraged scholars of conflict to pay more attention to the phenomenon of joining behavior.
Bremer's encouragement and work played an important role in shaping our efforts to collect a new, broader record of third parties' partisan-nonneutral-interventions in militarized disputes for the post-WWII period. While several records of third-party involvement in conflicts already exist, such records are limited to military interventions by states in wars and disputes and therefore allow us to draw only limited conclusions about joining behavior. Depending on the research question one tries to answer, such conclusions may also be biased because of the processes by which some states select themselves into the sample of military joiners. These shortcomings have substantive implications for many theoretical approaches to the studies of international conflict, ranging from the competing realist claims about balancing versus bandwagoning to models of spatial diffusion of conflict. Our data attempt to remedy such shortcomings by bringing into the picture, in addition to militarized interventions by third states, (1) interventions by third parties other than states, and especially by coalitions, IGOs, and NGOs; (2) nonmilitary forms of interventions, with particular emphasis on diplomatic and economic forms of joining behavior; and (3) interventions that are not directly precipitated by the occurrence of a militarized dispute, i.e., interventions that surround the temporal boundaries of interstate disputes as recorded in the MID data sets.
In this paper, we have briefly described the rationale and procedures that have guided the process of data collection, and we have provided a descriptive overview of the content and structure of the data. We have tried to show the usefulness of the data by using a portion of them to answer the research question asked by Yamamoto and Bremer in their 1980 "Wider Wars and Restless Nights" article. We showed that Yamamoto and Bremer's (1980) original conclusion about the tendency of major-power states to draw each other into ongoing conflicts is correct and is actually reinforced by the use of our data. Equally important, our simple investigation shows that by looking at both nonmilitary and military forms of intervention, we can now raise a broader set of hypotheses about the joining behavior of major-power states and about the evolution of interstate conflicts. Overall, our data should make it easier to address such questions. They should allow researchers interested in interventions and joining behavior to develop even more refined hypotheses that take into account other types of third parties, more discriminate manifestations of joining, and a more realistic depiction of the timing and order of events that lead third parties to become actual joiners.
